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Abstract
Having a child with a disability is considered a barrier to self-sufficiency among welfare
recipients. This study examines the impact of children’s educational disability on single-mother
families’ welfare exits and re-entries for a cohort of children in a metropolitan region in Missouri,
who were born between 1982 and 1994, and received AFDC/TANF at least once from 1990
through 2008 (N=4,928). A semiparametric proportional hazards model for recurrent events is
used to analyze the relationship between a child’s educational disability and family welfare exit
and re-entry. Results show that families with children with disabilities (the disability group) are
less likely to exit and more likely to re-enter the welfare system than families with children
without disabilities (the nondisability group). After the 1996 welfare reform, the welfare exit rate
increases more for the disability group than for the nondisability group, while the welfare re-entry
rate decreases less for the disability group than for the nondisability group.
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1. Introduction
The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 (PRWORA) replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and ended the entitlement status of
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welfare. One goal of PRWORA was to reduce welfare dependency and promote economic
self-sufficiency by increasing work participation. Previous research on the characteristics of
“hard-to-employ” welfare recipients (e.g., Brandon & Hogan, 2004; Lukemeyer, Meyers, &
Smeeding, 2000; Nam, 2005; Porterfield, 2002; Zedlewski, Holcomb, & Loprest, 2007)
suggests that a mother’s ability to work may be substantially affected by her child’s
disability or impairment. Children with disabilities may need extraordinary or time-intensive
care (Knoll, 1992; LeRoy & Johnson, 2002; Porterfield, 2002), which not only limits the
scope and type of jobs mothers can do, but also impairs mothers’ employability. These
children may also require more material resources and investment, and have greater needs
for health care (Brandon, Hofferth, & Hogan, 2008). Families of children with disabilities
may use welfare programs more intensively or stay longer on welfare compared to those of
children without disabilities. However, existing studies have mixed findings on how child
disability is related to family welfare experience (Acs & Loprest, 1999; Brandon & Hogan,
2004). In addition, previous research has not examined whether or not the welfare
experience of children with disabilities and their families changed after welfare reform,
although the overall welfare rolls in the US declined considerably when the 1996 PRWORA
was implemented (Danielson & Klerman, 2008; Hofferth, Stanhope, & Harris, 2002).
To examine the association between child disability and family welfare experience, this
study uses longitudinal administrative records (1990–2008) on nearly 5,000 children in a
metropolitan region in Missouri. This study is unique in that the time period under scrutiny
spans the pre- and post-welfare reform era, allowing researchers to see if child disability is
associated with family welfare experience and whether this association (if any) changes after
the 1996 welfare reform. Two research questions are examined: (1) What is the association
between having a child with a disability and family welfare exit and re-entry? and (2) How
does such child disability related welfare experience change after the 1996 welfare reform?
2. Background
An economic analysis of welfare use (Grogger & Karoly, 2005) suggests that, in the pre-
welfare reform era, families of children with disabilities may have used welfare programs
more intensively or stayed longer on welfare compared to those of children without
disabilities. Caring for a child with a disability requires more time from parents, suggesting
that less time is available for paid employment. As the only parent present in a single-
mother family, mother’s employment status is affected by child disability status. Mothers
may also be less competitive in the labor market due to their lack of alternative qualified
care for children with disabilities. For low income single-mother families, welfare
participation may be preferred over maintaining a low-pay job for both the untaxed income
and health needs of these families. Welfare recipients are categorically eligible for Medicaid
while health insurance provided by a low-pay job, if any, is likely inadequate to meet the
family’s needs (Brandon & Hogan, 2004; Brandon, Hofferth, & Hogan, 2008).
The welfare use for families raising children with disabilities may be expected to decrease in
the post-reform era because of policy changes under PRWORA (e.g., work requirements,
sanctions, and time limits). The stringent work-related activity mandate and other policy
changes increase the costs of welfare participation even for mothers of children with
disabilities. These increased costs, combined with welfare stigma and burdensome
administrative requirements, may outweigh the benefits of welfare participation. For
instance, Parish, Rose, and Andrews (2010) found that employment rates increased for some
low-income mothers raising children with disabilities after TANF implementations. The
hypothesis of less welfare use among single-mother families raising children with
disabilities should be examined carefully because these children and their families may face
different policy options than families of children without disabilities. Many states, including
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Missouri, have a time-limit exemption for families caring for a member with a disability.
However, few families appear to take advantage of this option (Farrell et al., 2008). Only
6% of the welfare caseload in Missouri was exempted from the time limit as of 2002
(Dunton, 2003).
Empirical studies on the relationship between child disability and welfare exits/re-entries
show inconsistent findings. Using the functional limitation measure of child disability in the
1990 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), Acs and Loprest
(1999) found little evidence that having a child with a disability affects a family’s
probability of leaving AFDC in a sample of 760 welfare recipients in the early 1990s. The
only significant result was that mothers of children with limitations on activities and
schoolwork have a higher probability of exiting AFDC for reasons other than work. The
researchers suggested that families of children with disabilities may have left welfare for the
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.
Brandon and Hogan (2004), however, found that both child’s and mother’s disabilities
significantly decreased the probability of leaving welfare (lower welfare exit rate) in a
sample of nearly 900 unmarried mothers from the 1996 panel of the SIPP. A follow-up
study (Brandon & Hogan, 2008) found that both child’s and mother’s disabilities are strong
predictors of TANF re-entry and SSI entry. Similar to Acs and Loprest (1999), disability in
these two studies was measured by indicators of restrictions in activities of daily living and
limitations in performing age-appropriate social roles. A four-level categorical disability
measure was created, including (1) both mother and child are disabled; (2) only mother is
disabled; (3) only child is disabled; and (4) neither mother nor child are disabled. Whether
focused on welfare exit or re-entry, the two studies by Brandon and his colleagues (2004,
2008) seemed to suggest that families of children with disabilities have more intensive use
of welfare programs than those of children without disabilities, at least in the post-welfare
reform era. None of these studies examines the trend in program participation of single-
mother families of children with disabilities across welfare reform.
Given the inconsistencies in the existing literature, this study examines the relationship
between child disability and single-mother family welfare exits and re-entries using a
proportional hazards model. The study is different from the previous studies in the following
ways. First, we use administrative records in one state, providing a complete history of
welfare participation of each family over a period of nearly two decades (1990–2008)
including dates of multiple welfare exits and re-entries (previous studies model only one exit
or re-entry). An advantage of this administrative data is that it avoids sample reduction due
to left-censored data in hazard models. Second, child disability in this study is measured by
records of special education eligibility.
3. Methods
3.1 Data and Sample
This research uses administrative records in Missouri with an initial sample (N=5,082)
comprised of single-mother families that had a child aged 11 or younger and were AFDC
recipients during the sampling period (1993–1994) (Jonson-Reid et al., 2004).
Administrative data for these families from July 1990 to August 2008 were drawn from
multiple state agencies. Administrative data recorded respondents’ welfare participation
status (AFDC and TANF) during the observation period, including all entry and exit dates.
All cases had at least one spell on welfare prior to 1995. The study sample is further limited
to 4,928 children due to a small proportion of missing data and record errors (3%). Table 1
provides the descriptive statistics of the sample.
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3.2.1 Dependent Variables—A welfare spell is defined as a period of welfare receipt
(measured by months) by the single-mother family between the dates of program entry and
exit; and, similarly, an off-welfare spell is a period of welfare nonparticipation between the
dates of program exit and next entry. Following previous studies on welfare duration, one-
month welfare or off-welfare spells are not counted because they are likely caused by
administrative churnings and data entry errors (Acs & Loprest, 1999; Brandon & Hogan,
2004; Nam, 2005). Two dependent variables, exit from welfare and re-entry into welfare,
were created based on the operational definitions of welfare and off-welfare spells. Welfare
exit was used for welfare spell analysis, and welfare re-entry was used for off-welfare spell
analysis. In the observation period, 10,230 welfare spells and 10,043 off-welfare spells were
identified.
3.2.2 Independent Variables—The independent variable of primary interest is child
disability defined by receipt of special education. Each child’s special education status was
recorded in the administrative data, and was used to create a dummy indicator of educational
disability (yes/no). For simplicity, families caring for children with educational disabilities
in the sample are referred to as the disability group, and families of children with disabilities
are defined as the nondisability group.
3.2.3 Control Variables—Most control variables in the study were measured at the time
of sampling (1993–1994) and, therefore, are time-invariant except for child’s and mother’s
ages and the state unemployment rate. To follow the convention in research on family
welfare use and welfare dynamics, the following control variables were chosen: (1) child’s
characteristics: age, gender, and race (black compared to non-black); (2) mother’s
characteristics: age, education level (high school graduation or not), unemployment status
(unemployed or employed), and publicly funded mental health services (received services or
not); and (3) 1990 household median income of the census tract where the family was living
at the time of sampling. In addition, the state unemployment rate (obtained from the US
Department of Labor) was used to control for change in economic conditions over time. We
are not able to use county unemployment rate because the address of these families cannot
be observed over time. Finally, the post-reform indicator was created to indicate whether the
welfare/off-welfare spell starts before or after TANF policy implementation in Missouri on
July 1, 1997, since the policy of time limits went into effect on July 1, 1997 in Missouri
(Pandey, Porterfield, Choi-Ko, & Yoon, 2003). The models were also tested using
December 1, 1996 as the cutoff line, and consistent results were found.
3.3 Analytic Strategy
The relationship between child disability and family welfare use is estimated using a
semiparametric proportional hazards model (Cox regression). Previous studies used discrete
hazard models because the exact dates of welfare exit and re-entry were unknown (Acs &
Loprest, 1999; Brandon & Hogan, 2004). In this study, there is no concern about left-
censored data because all entry and exit dates of welfare spells during the study period are
observed. A variance-corrected method is utilized to adjust the correlation between repeated
welfare/off-welfare spells of single-mother families (Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn, 2002;
Cook & Lawless, 2002). Because families’ repeated welfare/off-welfare spells follow a
sequential order, a conditional risk set is defined in the study (Box-Steffensmeier & De
Boef, 2006). That is, a family is not at risk for a subsequent spell until it has experienced all
the previous spells. In addition, assuming the baseline hazards associated with different
welfare/off-welfare spells vary, the conditional risk-set proportional model is stratified by
the sequence of spells to create event-specific baseline hazards. For example, the hazard rate
is likely to be different for the first welfare spell as compared to the third spell.
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Three sets of analyses are conducted in this study. Model 1 estimates the impact of child
disability on family welfare use across the observation period, conditional on all control
variables. While the post-reform indicator is controlled for, Model 1 cannot estimate
whether the association between child disability and family welfare experience changed
after welfare reform. Therefore, Model 2 applies a difference-in-difference specification to
include an interaction term of child disability and the post-reform indicator, with which we
are able to examine the welfare use of the disability and nondisability groups prior to and
after welfare reform. The regression coefficient of the interaction term provides an
estimation of the change of the impact of child disability in the post-reform era.
The finding regarding the post-reform indicator and its interaction term with child disability
in Model 2 should be interpreted carefully. Welfare reform involves very complicated policy
changes with various components, and many factors can lead to welfare exit or entry
(Hofferth, Stanhope, & Harris, 2002), such as maternal employment, marital status change,
enhanced income, and entry into the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI). These
cannot be fully captured by a dummy measure of the post-reform indicator.
Additionally, the post-reform variable is a time indicator, and may be confounded with child
development over time. Model 3, therefore, examines the effect of child disability on
welfare/off-welfare spells on two respective subsamples: families with children aged six and
younger vs. those older than six. Because mothers may choose to stay home when their
children are young, and reenter the work force after their children enter school (Porterfield,
2002), the interaction term in Model 3 for the full sample might reflect the effects of child
development (e.g., some children with disabilities may need less care from mothers when
they are older and go to school). Thus, the strategy of age separation in Model 3 may be




Table 1 reports the demographic characteristics of the study sample. The prevalence of
educational disability in this study was 23%, substantially higher than the national estimate
(13%; Wagner, Cameto, & Guzman, 2003). This, however, is not entirely unexpected
because of the poverty status of the sample (Lee, Sills, & Oh, 2002). It is known that
children in poor or one-parent families have a higher incidence rate of disability (Hogan,
Rogers, & Msall, 2000). The sample children were about 19 years old on average at the end
of the observation period. About half of the children were female. The majority of the
sample was categorized as Black (82%), which is reflective of the demographics of families
receiving welfare in the study region. Mothers of these children were mostly in their early
20s when the child was born (M=24, SD=6). Less than 60% of mothers had a high school
diploma at the time of sampling. Given that all these families were covered by the AFDC/
TANF program at some point during the study period, it is not surprising that the mothers’
unemployment rate was high (87%). Most of the study families lived in disadvantaged
communities. The high school graduation rate (M=62%) and the household median income
(M=$24,570 in 1990 dollars) in the census tract where the family was living at the time of
sampling are lower than the national averages (75% and $30,056, respectively). The results
reveal that the disability group differs from the nondisability group on most of the
characteristics (child’s and mother’s).
Table 2 shows the characteristics of welfare and off-welfare spells in the sample. There are a
total of 10,230 welfare spells and 10,043 off-welfare spells, respectively. Excluding right-
censored spells, the average welfare spell is about 28 months across the entire observation
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period, and the average off-welfare spell is about 22 months. Families raising children with
disabilities have longer average welfare spells (32 months) and shorter off-welfare spells (20
months), highlighting their more disadvantaged socioeconomic status compared with those
without disabilities. As expected, welfare duration dropped considerably (more than 50%)
after welfare reform for both the disability and nondisability groups. However, off-welfare
duration in post-reform, on average, is three months shorter than that in pre-reform. It is
worth noting that the difference in welfare durations between the disability group and the
nondisability group becomes smaller after welfare reform (6.3 months in pre-reform vs. 0.1
months in post-reform), which may indicate a greater decline of welfare use among families
caring for children with disabilities.
4.2 Child Disability and Welfare Spells
Tables 3 and 4 list hazard ratios for the analyses. Model 1 (Table 3, Column 1) includes
child disability and control variables in the analysis. It shows that, in general, families of
children with disabilities are less likely to exit welfare compared to their counterparts. The
relative risk of welfare exit, at any time, for the disability group is about 87% of that for the
nondisability group, and this is statistically significant at the .01 level. In other words, the
welfare exit rate is 13% lower for families with children with disabilities than those without
children with disabilities, given that they have not exited from welfare program in previous
stages. The post-reform indicator has a positive regression coefficient in Model 1,
statistically significant at the .01 level. When all other variables are held constant, the rate of
program exit after welfare reform is 77% higher than that before welfare reform.
The interaction term in Model 2 (Table 3, Column 2) is statistically significant and positive,
suggesting that the group difference (disability vs. nondisability) in the welfare exit rate
changes significantly after welfare reform. The hazard ratio of exit from welfare increases
significantly more for the disability group than the nondisability group post welfare reform.
Specifically, the rate of welfare exit for the former is lower than the latter by 16% before
welfare reform and 3% after welfare reform (See Note 2 in Table 3). These estimations are
consistent with the descriptive statistics reported in Table 2: the average duration of welfare
spells reduces by 23 months for families with children with disabilities and by 15 months for
those of children without disabilities in the post-welfare reform era.
Finally, Model 3 was tested on welfare spells for children in different age groups: those six
years and under vs. those older than six (Table 3, Columns 3 and 4), in hopes that this
separation can, to some extent, separate the effects of child development. The variables of
child disability, the post-reform indicator, and their interaction term show a similar pattern
in both tests, but with different magnitudes. The interaction term has a statistically positive
association with the dependent variable for both age groups. Specifically, in the younger
group, the disability group is 10% less likely to exit welfare than the nondisability group in
pre-reform, but are 55% more likely to exit welfare after welfare reform (See Note 3 in
Table 3). In the older group, the difference in the welfare exit rate between the disability and
nondisability groups is 20% before welfare reform, and 2% after (See Note 4 in Table 3).
Among the other control variables, both mother’s age when the child was born and mother’s
age at the beginning of the welfare spell are used to indicate mother’s earning power. Since
child’s age equals the difference between the two variables of mother’s age, we do not
include child’s age in the model. In addition, we have an indicator of whether the examined
welfare spell occurs before or after child’s special education assessment, assuming disability
assessment outcomes may change family’s welfare participation. All control variables have
expected directions: (1) Black children, child disability status, mother’s age when entering
the spell, mother’s unemployment status at the time of sampling, and the state
unemployment rate are negatively related to the probability of welfare exit; and (2) mother’s
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age when the child was born, mother’s education, and the neighborhood economic status are
positively related to welfare exit.
4.3 Child Disability and Off-welfare Spells
Analyses of welfare re-entries yield results different from those of welfare exits reported in
Table 3, mainly for the interaction term of child disability and the post-reform indicator.
As shown in Model 1 of Table 4, there is a positive association between child disability and
welfare re-entries: the rate of welfare re-entry for the disability group is 46% higher than
that of the nondisability group. According to Model 2, the interaction term of child disability
and the post-reform indicator (Table 4, Column 2) is statistically significant at the .10 level.
The welfare return rate for the disability group is 40% greater than the nondisability group
prior to welfare reform. However, after welfare reform, the difference in the welfare return
rate between the two groups increases to 62% (see Note 2 in Table 4), despite the fact that
both groups have a significantly lower return rate. In other words, the welfare return rate
decreases less for the disability group than the nondisability group. The interaction term is
no longer statistically significant after the off-welfare spells are separated into two age
groups (Table 4, Columns 3 and 4).
In summary, the above analyses of welfare and off-welfare spells show that child disability
status is an important factor associated with family welfare use. Consistent with studies of
Brandon and his colleagues (Brandon, Hofferth, & Hogan, 2008; Brandon & Hogan, 2004),
child disability generally is associated with a lower rate of welfare exit and a higher rate of
welfare return. After the 1996 welfare reform, the welfare exit rate increases faster for the
disability group than for the nondisability group, while the welfare re-entry rate decreases
less for the former than for the latter.
5. Discussion
Using longitudinal administrative data from a Midwestern state, this study explores the
impact of child educational disability on family welfare exits and re-entries. The study finds
that families caring for children with disabilities stay on welfare longer and are more likely
to need assistance again after welfare exits. The study also finds that the difference in
welfare exit/welfare re-entry between the two groups (disability vs. nondisability) has
changed since welfare reform was enacted. After welfare reform, there is only a 3%
difference (a decrease of 13 percentage points) in the welfare exit rate between children with
and without disabilities (Table 3, results from Model 2). One possibility is that these
children have been transferred to the SSI program (not measured in this data set); families of
children with disabilities may look for more stable income solutions after welfare reform.
One alternative explanation is that child care subsidy policies targeting low-income families
have expanded remarkably since the 1996 welfare reform (Blau & Tekin, 2003; Robins,
2007), providing stronger support for increased work effort among mothers of children with
disabilities. For instance, in 1998, low-income parents in Missouri received child care
subsidies ranging from $5 to $25.75 a day for each child, with higher amounts going to
those with lower incomes. During the two and half years after welfare reform, the number of
registered vendors in the child care subsidy program grew by 600% (Bower, 1999).
However, the disability group has a welfare re-entry rate 62% higher than the nondisability
group (Table 4, results from Model 2). While the increased welfare exit rate suggests that all
families, with and without children with disabilities, have lower program utilization after
welfare reform, the increased difference in re-entry rates between the two groups suggests
that families of children with disabilities may be more vulnerable to unstable employment
and other barriers to staying off welfare.
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When the sample children are separated into two subsamples by age for the analysis of
welfare spells, the results for the older group is consistent with that of the full sample.
However, the larger magnitude of the interaction term for the younger group (Column 3 of
Table 3) shows that younger children with disabilities have a much larger increase in the
welfare exit rate after welfare reform. This somehow conflicts with our prediction of the
relationship between child development and welfare use. It was hypothesized that younger
children with disabilities experience less increase in the welfare exit rate due to their greater
needs for care compared to their older counterparts. It is not clear why younger children
with disabilities actually have a drastic decline in welfare use after welfare reform in this
sample. It is possible that the estimation of the younger group is less reliable due to a
smaller sample size (only 32 children in the younger group having welfare spells after
welfare reform). More child care support for working families after welfare reform, such as
child care subsidy, could be another explanation. These subsidies could have greater effects
for younger children. It is also relatively easier to find child care for younger children. There
are fewer public subsidies and fewer support services for older children with disabilities
(greater than 12 years). For example, no after-school support and few summer camp
programs are available once kids are 13 and older. Nevertheless, this needs to be further
evaluated in the future.
5.1 Limitations
With a focus on the welfare use of families caring for children with disabilities, the nature of
this study is exploratory, and the results should be interpreted with caution. First, AFDC/
TANF is managed by both the federal and the state governments, and state policy regarding
this program varies greatly. As a result, findings from one state may not reflect families’
welfare experiences in other states. Second, while the post-reform era is considered, the
study cannot and does not intend to evaluate the effects of welfare reform on the welfare use
of children with disabilities and their families. There are a number of policy changes in the
1996 PRWORA with differing and even contradicting policy goals (Grogger and Karoly,
2005). The post-reform indicator is used to show the time trend in welfare use by families
caring for children with disabilities and can by no means be interpreted as the effect of
welfare reform or any of its components.
We also did not examine the reasons for welfare exit and re-entry because of the lack of
data. Welfare exit may be a result of gained or increased employment and earnings, changes
in living arrangement, sanctions, and/or SSI entry. Without this information, it is not clear
whether welfare exit actually indicates economic self-sufficiency. In addition, the time
dimension, as indicated by the post-reform variable, may confound with a number of factors
(e.g., child development or macro economic performance). Although our analysis shows that
child development cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of family welfare experience, a
cohort study would be a better design to minimize the confounding effects. Finally, due to
the nature of administrative data, the covariates included in the above analysis are relatively
limited (e.g., lack of information on maternal impairment and employment status over time).
This may result in model misspecification and estimation biases, and does not allow further
exploration of the mechanism regarding the welfare use trend of children with disabilities.
Future research is needed to examine the impact of child disability on family welfare
experience. More importantly, specific policy options, such as work requirements, sanctions,
and time limits, as well as alternatives to welfare, such as SSI or marriage, should be
included in the analysis. The effect of each of these policy options on the welfare
participation decision of families should be evaluated since families of children with
disabilities may face some policy options different from those for other families. Answers to
these questions would provide a basis for stronger policy support of families caring for
children with disabilities.
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Since child disability is a barrier to achieving economic self-sufficiency for welfare families,
more support should be provided for families of children with disabilities. One policy option
may be to provide sufficient child care for these families. Despite the increase of child care
subsidies after welfare reform, nearly one-third of low-income families were denied child
care due to child disability (Cutler & Gilkerson, 2002). Child care support is available for
low-income mothers for only a short period, with the average subsidy lasting only three to
seven months (Meyers et al. 2002). Given these children’s special needs, inclusive and high-
quality child care programs are needed to enable the caregiver to work. Also, child care
subsidies for these families should be made available for a longer period after they leave
welfare so that parents are able to maintain employment and achieve economic self-
sufficiency.
In addition, it may make sense for child care subsidy programs, which typically require
parents to pay for 30% of child care costs (Waldfogel, 2006), to cover a higher proportion of
costs for children with disabilities. For example, states may set a higher reimbursement rate
for the care of children with disabilities, or take into account the factor of child disability
when calculating parent copayment. Tax credits can be provided to subsidize child care for
mothers of children with disabilities (Burman, Maag, & Rohaly, 2005). Furthermore, these
programs should also give parents of children with disabilities more flexibility in choosing
child care arrangements, such as informal child care, child care centers, and other
approaches because their access to quality care is often limited.
Second, work polices should allow working mothers of children with disabilities to have
more time to care for their children. The continuing needs of children with disabilities for
health services may require parents to have intermittent absences from their work.
Unfortunately, nearly half of all workers and three-fourths of those in the bottom fifth of
income do not have paid sick leave (Boots, Macomber, & Danziger, 2008). The Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) is a helpful provision for mothers of children with disabilities
(Parish & Cloud, 2006) because it allows parents to take unpaid, job-protected leave to care
for an ill or disabled family member. In addition, mothers of children with disabilities
should be allowed to have a flexible work schedule. These polices may together create a
better work-family balance for these mothers, and may produce positive effects in reducing
welfare dependency.
Third, time limit exemptions for families raising children with disabilities should be
appropriately implemented. Exempting these families from the time limit is a policy adopted
by 26 states, including Missouri, as of 2007 (Farrell et al., 2008). But as reported in Dunton
(2003), the number of welfare recipients receiving the time limit exemption in Missouri is
very small, possibly due to the rules which are unclear and not uniformly applied even
within the same state (Farrell et al., 2008).
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• We examine the association between child disability and family welfare use.
• Welfare exit rate increases more for children with disabilities after TANF.
• Welfare re-entry rate decreases less for children with disabilities after TANF.
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Table 3
Child’s Educational Disability and Welfare Exits






Child with a disability 0.87*** 0.84*** 0.90** 0.80***
Post-reform indicator 1.77*** 1.70*** 1.72*** 1.42***
Disability*Post-reform indicator 1.16*** 1.72*** 1.22***
Child’s Characteristics
Race (black) 0.92*** 0.92*** 0.93* 0.88***
Gender (female) 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Post-disability assessment 0.88*** 0.90*** 1.08 0.91**
Mother’s Characteristics
Age at birth 1.20*** 1.20*** 1.60*** 1.13***
Age at spell 0.83*** 0.83*** 0.63*** 0.88***
Unemployment status (unemployed) 0.93** 0.93** 0.93 0.97
High school graduation (yes) 1.16*** 1.16*** 1.02 1.04***
Mother uses mental health services 0.98 0.98 0.82* 1.02
Macroeconomic Indicators
Census Tract Median household income 1.11*** 1.11*** 1.12*** 1.13***
State unemployment rate 0.95*** 0.95*** 0.84*** 0.93***
1
Hazard ratios reported in Table. * p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01.
2
According to Model 2, the rate of welfare exit of the disability group is 3% lower than that of the nondisability group after welfare reform {3%=1-
exp[log(.84)+log(1.16)]}.
3
According to Model 3 for children of six years old and younger, the welfare exit rate of the disability group is 50% higher than that of the
nondisability group after welfare reform {−50%=exp[1-log(.90)+log(1.72)]}.
4
According to Model 3 for children of seven years and older, the welfare exit rate of the disability group is 2% lower than that of the nondisability
group after welfare reform {2%=1-exp[log(.80)+log(1.22)]}.
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Table 4
Child’s Educational Disability and Welfare Re-entries






Child with a disability 1.46*** 1.40*** 1.12 1.43***
Post-reform indicator 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.66*** 0.25***
Disability*Post-reform indicator 1.15* 1.00 1.04
Child’s Characteristics
Race (black) 1.20*** 1.20*** 1.05 1.17***
Gender (female) 0.93** 0.93** 0.94 0.93*
Post-disability assessment 2.80*** 2.85*** 1.73*** 2.08***
Mother’s Characteristics
Age at birth 0.82*** 0.82*** 0.61*** 0.78***
Age at spell 1.21*** 1.21*** 1.62*** 1.26***
Unemployment status (unemployed) 0.81*** 0.81*** 0.88** 0.85***
High school graduation (yes) 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.97
Mother uses mental health services 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.00
Macroeconomic Indicators
Census tract’s household median income 1.01 1.01 0.98 1.03
State unemployment rate 0.97 0.97 1.21*** 0.73***
1
Hazard ratios reported in Table. *p<.1,** p<.05, ***p<.01.
2
According to Model 2, the welfare return rate of the disability group is 62% higher than that of the nondisability group after welfare reform
{62%=1-exp[log(1.40)+log(1.15)]}.
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